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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial of this case resulted in the establishment of 
these facts among others : That the respondents and the 
appellants obtained their respective properties from the 
same predecessor, namely, A. H. LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre, 
who obtained the entire property in question in this law 
suit from Olof L. Hedenberg and Annie E. Hedenberg, 
his wife, by a warranty deed dated September 19, 1922, 
with the following description: 
"Commencing 21 chains West and 14.50 chains 
South of the Northeast Corner of Southeast 1~ of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Sec. 7, Township 7 South, Range 2 East of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; Running thence South 1 
degree West 4.87 chains; thence South 89 degrees 
East 7.71 chains more or less to the Street line; 
thence North 29 degrees West 5.62 chains more or 
less along the Street line to the intersection of the 
Street running East and West; thence North 89 
degrees West along said Street line 4.90 chains, more 
or less to the place of be~inning, the same being a 
part of the Southeast %, of Section 7, containing 
an area of 3.07 acres." 
On the sixth day of May, 1924, in a deed dated of that 
date and recorded on the same date, A. H. Le Vitre and 
Lydia Le Vitre, his wife, conveyed the property which is 
now the appellants' property to Henry Clavel and S. Per-
kowski who conveyed the property to the appellants herein 
in 1925. On the eighth day of May, 1924, the property which 
is now the respondents' property was conveyed by A. H. 
Le Vitre to Lydia Le Vitre, however, both A. H. Le Vitre and 
Lydia Le Vitre executed various mortgages and other se-
curity instruments from that time against the property of 
respondents until 1936. Then the respondents' property 
through successive transfers came to the respondents some-
time in 1945 and the dispute between these parties arising 
sometime in 1951, as a result of a purported survey by the 
respondents. 
At the time the appellants purchased their property in 
1925, there was a street on the east (which is still there) 
known as the State Highway and a street on the north of 
their property known as Ninth South Street in Provo, Utah, 
(which street is still there). At the time of purchase of 
the property by the appellants in 1925, there was a fence 
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separating the property on the north from the street, which 
fence is still there, and on the south of appellants' property 
there was no fence at all. The evidence further shows 
that sometime in 1925 after the appellants purchased the 
property that Mr. LeVitre and Mr. William Young, one 
of the appellants herein, went out upon the ground and Mr. 
Le Vitre made marks on the fence at the east and on the 
west of appellants' property as being the mark setting off 
the south boundary of the appellants' property; 
The evidence further shows that Mr. and Mrs. LeVitre 
owned the property which is now the respondents' prop-
erty and occupied the same until 1936. This fact is shown 
both by the testimony of appellant, William Young, and by 
the fact that the respondents' property was mortgaged 
several times and satisfaction of the same was shown as 
being executed in Provo, Utah, until 1936 (see Abstract of 
Title) . The evidence also shows without dispute that the 
appellants, William Young and Andrew Young, built the 
fence in question on the line pointed out by Mr. LeVitre in 
1928, in the month of April or May. That a certain person 
by the name of Chris Peterson who had purchased prop-
erty to the south of the Le Vitre property purchased the 
wire and posts but had no part in building the fence or 
locating it where it was built in 1928, and where it is today. 
That the appellants, William Young and Andrew Young, 
built the fence as a boundary fence and that the LeVitres 
occupied and possessed the property until 1936, at which 
time it was conveyed to one of respondents' predecessors 
in title. The evidence also shows by the testimony of Wil-
liam Young that measurements were taken of appellants' 
, 
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property from the old fence on the north of his property to 
the old fence on the south of his property at both ends and 
that the distance measured was 126 feet. 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that there was 
no survey of the property in question made by either of 
the parties' or known by either of the parties ftom the time 
appellants purchased their property in 1925, until the re-
spondents allegedly had a survey made in 1950. There is 
no other evidence concerning the location of appellants' 
south boundary except as previously stated. It is also a 
fact worthy to be mentioned, that the respondents pur-
chased their property in 1945, after having made a physical 
inspection of the property, together with an observation 
as to the location of the existing fences and that their pur-
chase was made thereafter. That respondents assumed 
and used the existing fences as boundaries until1951, when 
they made demand upon appellants to move their fence. 
APPELLANTS' POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE COMMON PREDECESSOR IN 
TITLE OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND RE-
SPONDENTS INTENDED TO CONVEY PROP-
ERTY TO APPELLANTS LYING SOUTH AND 
WEST OF 9TH SOUTH STREET AND STATE 
HIGHWAY IN PROVO, UTAH, BY HIS CON-
VEYANCE IN .1924, AND THAT RESPOND-
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ENTS ARE BOUND BY THAT PRIOR CON-
V~YANCE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE FENCE ERECTED BY APPEL-
LANTS IN 1928 HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS 
A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN APPELLANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS IN 
TITLE FROM THAT TIME UNTIL 1951 WHEN 
THIS SUIT WAS BROUGHT AND THAT SAID 
FENCE HAS BECOME A BOUNDARY FENCE 
WHICH CANNOT BE MOVED BY RESPOND-
ENTS. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 




THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE COMMON PREDECESSOR IN 
TITLE OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND RE-
SPONDENTS INTENDED TO CONVEY PROP-
ERTY TO APPELLANTS LYING SOUTH AND 
WEST OF 9TH SOUTH STREET AND STATE 
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HIGHWAY IN PROVO, UTAH, BY HIS CON-
VEYANCE IN 1924, AND THAT RESPOND-
ENTS ARE BOUND BY THAT PRIOR CON-
VEYANCE. 
It is to be noted from the evidence that in 1922, when 
the predecessor of the parties hereto, A. H. Le Vitre and 
Lydia Le Vitre, received their property, it was described 
as set out in the facts showing metes and bounds in part 
as follows: 
"Thence South 89 degrees East 7.71 chains, 
more or less, to the Street line; thence North 29 
degrees West 5.62 chains, more or less, along the 
street line to the intersection of the street running 
East and West; thence North 89 degrees West along 
said street line 4.90 chains, more or less, to the place 
of beginning." 
This deed shows a recognition of the existing streets and 
described the property in relation thereto. The importance 
of this being that the predecessors in title of respondents 
and appellants received only the property inside the natural 
boundaries established by State Street on the east and Ninth 
South Street on the North. The property conveyed in 1924, 
to appellants' predecessor in title failed to show the limi-
tation of the existing streets. Likewise, the conveyance at 
a later time of the property of respondents to their prede-
cessor, Lydia Le Vitre, likewise failed to show the limita-
tion of the existing streets. However, it would appear to be 
a matter of fundamental law that the deeds in question 
must be construed to include only a sale of property owned 
by the grantors and that certainly it was not the intention 
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of the grantors of appellants to convey property out in the 
existing streets and then through another line of deeds, 
encroach upon the· property necessary to make the full 
measure of property conveyed to appellants. The grantors 
by their actions and acquiescence have shown what the 
intention of their conveyance was. 
Another way of saying this is that certainly Lydia 
Le Vitre cannot through her successors in title derogate 
from her grant to the appellants herein. The testimony 
shows that the width of the property north and south be-
tween the old fence on the north and the old fence on the 
south of appellants' property is 126 feet which is almost 
the exact measurement of appellants' property given by 
their deed. Thus we see that the appellants are occupying 
only the amount of ground given to them by their deed 
bounded on two sides by existing streets and that to permit 
the respondents to move the fence on the south would re-
sult in the reduction of property given to appellants by 
respondents' predecessor in title. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE FENCE ERECTED BY APPEL-
LANTS IN 1928 HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS 
A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN APPELLANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS IN 
TITLE FROM THAT TIME UNTIL 1951 WHEN 
THIS SUIT WAS BROUGHT AND THAT SAID 
FENCE HAS BECOME A BOUNDARY FENCE 
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WHICH CANNOT BE MOVED BY RESPOND-
ENTS. 
Perhaps the most important question which arises in 
this case is the one concerning whether or not the building 
of a fence by appellants herein in the year 1928 upon the 
line pointed out by A. H. LeVitre and the maintenance of 
that fence until the present time brings this case within 
the rules established by the decisions of our courts concern-
ing the establishment of boundaries by practical location, 
or acquiescence. The appellants do not admit and I do not 
believe the evidence compels us to concede that the appel-
lants occupied any of the respondents' deeded ground, but 
we shall turn our attention to the question just propounded. 
Beginning with the case of Larsen vs. Onesite, 21 U. 
38, 59 P. 234, where it is said: 
"where adjoining land owners and their predeces-
sors in title have occupied their lands to a given 
line, and have treated such line as a boundary be-
tween their land for twenty years, neither owner can 
claim beyond such line." 
To the case of Ekburg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205, U. 
our courts .have recognized the doctrine of boundary by 
practical location and by acquiescence. In this case the un-
disputed evidence shows that some time after the purchase 
of the property in question by appellants that A. H. LeVitre, 
the common predecessor in title of the parties hereto, ac-
tually pointed out the marks on the east and west fence, 
respectively, of the appellants' property which would mark 
the south boundary of said property. That the appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
built the fence along said line in the spring of 1928 and 
that the appellants and respondents and their predecessors 
cultivated and used the land to the respective sides of the 
fence without ever at any time disputing the fact that it 
was indeed the boundary. The evidence shows that the 
appellants built chicken coops along said fence, planted 
trees and shrubbery along said fence, and planted fruit 
trees and cultivated the disputed strip of ground. The evi-
dence also shows that the respondents' predecessors, the 
Le Vitres, built sheds on the south side of said fence, includ-
ing a garage. That the successive owners of the respond-
ents' property purchased said property and occupied the 
same without making any survey and without ever raising 
any question as to the boundary between the two proper-
ties until the respondents herein brought their action. Ac-
quiescence in the maintenance of a fence or boundary is 
essentially negative in form and thus where the parties 
have occupied and improved their respective properties on 
each side of the fence without protest for a period of over 
seven years, then the doctrine of acquiescence is to be ap-
plied. 
In the case of Brown vs. Millner, 
2d 202, it is said as follows : 
u. ., 232 P. 
"We have further held in this state that in ab-
sence of evidence that the owners of adjoining prop-
erty or their predecessors in interest ever expressly 
agreed as to the location of the boundary between 
them, if they have occupied their respective premises 
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monu-
ments, fences or buildings for . a long period of 
time and mutually recognized it as the dividing line 
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between them, the law will imply an agreement fix-
ing the boundary as located, if it can do so consist-
ently with the facts appearing, and will not permit 
the parties nor their grantees to depart from such 
line. 
"In some of the opinions of this court on the 
subject of disputed boundaries, there are statements 
~ to the effect that the location of the true boundary 
must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute before an 
agreement between the adjoining land owners fix-
ing the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp vs. 
Bagley, in support therof. Such statements should 
be understood to mean that if the location of the 
true boundary line is known to the adjoining owners, 
they cannot by parol agreement establish the bound-
ary elsewhere. As was pointed out in the Tripp case, 
such an agreement would be in contravention of the 
statute of frauds. But the Tripp case does not re-
quire a party relying upon a boundary which has 
been acquiesced in for a long period of time to pro-
duce evidence that the location of the true boundary 
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the 
true boundary was uncertain or in dispute and that 
the parties agreed upon the recognized boundary as 
the dividing line will be implied from the parties' 
long acquiescence. 
"The line must be open, visible, marked by mon-
uments, fences or buildings and recognized as the 
boundary for a long term of years. It was expressly 
stated by the court in the case of Holmes vs. Judge, 
that there was no evidence how the fence and build-
ing which were recognized as the boundary came 
to be erected, or that there was ever any dispute 
between the adjoining owners concerning the loca-
tion of the true boundary, or that any question was 
ever raised as to its location until shortly before the 
plaintiff commenced his action." 
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In this case we have the evidence before the court as 
to how the fence was built and we have the undisputed 
testimony that it was built pursuant to an agrement be-
tween A. H. LeVitre and William Young, who was the 
common grantor in the chain of title of both the parties 
hereto. This evidence certainly is sufficient within itself 
to show a practical location of the boundary between the 
two properties in question. However, we have the additional 
facts that the fence was built on a line pointed out by Mr. 
Le Vitre and that the respective owners and successive 
owners of the respondents' property beginning with A. H. 
LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre down to the present respond-
ents occupied the property to the south without question as 
to proper location of said fence and, in fact, the present 
respondents purchased the property with the full under-
standing that the fence on the north marked the north 
boundary of their property. 
As pointed out in the above Millner case and in the 
portion particularly italicized, we see that the courts an-
nounced the doctrine that it is not necessary for the party 
relying upon the doctrine of acquiescence to show that there 
was ever any dispute or doubt as to the location of the 
true boundary. In this case we have the fact that when 
the property was purchased by appellants there was no 
fence in existence on the south to mark the division be-
tween their property and the property retained by the 
LeVitres. Certainly, from an actual, practical considera-
tion there was uncertainty as to the location of the bound-
ary in this case. The additional facts of the building of 
the fence along the line pointed out by Mr. LeVitre and 
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the long acquiescence by the parties hereto and their prede-
cessors to that line and the recognition of it as the bound-
ary certainly reinforces the evidence produced by the ap-
pellant, William Young, that there was, indeed, an agree-
ment establishing the fence in question as the boundary 
line. 
It is also to be noted in summary that the property 
occupied by appellant is the same amount as called for by 
his deed and that the original deed of the grantors, A. H. 
LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre, clearly places the property in-
side the existing streets which bound the property on two 
sides. Under these facts it would seem proper to apply the 
doctrine of practical location to establish the boundary on 
the line where it is today. 
As concerns the establishment of a boundary by prac-
tical location, the general law is as set out in 11 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Page 650 as follows : 
"Practical location is but an actual designation 
by the parties on the ground of the monuments and 
bounds called for by their deeds. To constitute a 
practical location of a line, the mutual act and acqui-
escence between the parties is required. It is in fact 
merely the result of an agreement or acquiescence 
between the parties shown by the location of monu-
ments and marks on the ground. 
"A practical location made by the common 
grantor of the division line between the tracts 
granted is· binding on the· grantees who take with 
reference to that boundary. The line established in 
that manner is presumably the line mentioned in 
the deed, and no lapse of time is necessary to es-
tablish such location, which does not rest on ac-
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quiescence in an erroneous boundary, but on the fact 
that the true location was made, and. the conveyance 
in reference to it." 
In the most recent pronouncement by our Supreme 
Court found in Oscar F. Ekberg et ux. vs. Von D. Bates, 
et ux., 239 P. 2d 205, . . U .. ' .. , (1951) said: 
"In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed 
that the original picket fence was built by a man 
who owned both appellants' and respondents' tracts 
of land at that time and therefore it is apparent it 
was not erected to mark a boundary line. For the 
portion of that time during which both tracts were 
owned by the same person, there could be no bound-
ary by acquiescence. However, the court made an-
other finding in which it found that when the board 
fence was erected in 1927, the true boundary line 
was still uncertain and in dispute and that this fence 
was erected as a boundary fence and acquiesced in 
as such by the parties hereto and their grantors up 
until the time this suit was brought." 
"The length of time necessary to establish a 
boundary line by acquiescence has never been def-
initely established in this jurisdiction. Each case 
must usually be determined on its own facts: In 
other jurisdictions there have been statements made 
which indicate that the length of time should be at 
least that prescribed by the statute of limitations. 
In the case of Kesler vs. Ellis, 4 7 Idaho 7 40, 278 P. 
366, the court said: "* * * while the authorities 
are helplessly confused and generally uncertain as to 
the time the acquiescence as to the location of the 
boundary line should continue in order to satisfy the 
rule, it is but logical to say that such acquiescence 
must continue for a period of not less than five 
years, thus conforming to the period established by 
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the statute of limitations in cases of adverse pos-
session * * * " 
"In the instant case as we have pointed out 
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence for 
more than 7 years (the Utah limitations period for 
adverse possession) before appellants acquired their 
title and under all the circumstances shown herein 
that was a sufficient length of time to establish the 
line so that appellants are precluded from claiming 
that it is not the true line." 
"It is true that since Ekberg, Jr. has been the 
owner of the property he has verbally protested that 
the fence was not the true boundary line and there-
fore he probably did not actually acquiesce in it, still 
he did not take any action to assert ownership until 
this suit was commenced about 14 years after he. 
acquired the title. Under all these circumstances we 
are of the opinion the court did not err when it 
found that the board fence was the boundary line by 
acquiescence." 
It would appear that under both doctrines that the 
appellants have established their right to occupy and use 
the property up to the existing fence on the south and 
that said fence should be considered as the boundary be-
tween the properties of respondents and appellants. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY .OF RESPOND-
ENTS' LAND. 
As previously indicated appellants do not concede that 
they occupy any of the respondents' ground. The surveyor, 
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Frank Jones, testified (Beginning on page 29, line 17 to 
page 33, line 30) that in the sections of land there is usually 
an overage or a shortage of ground in respect to a sur-
veyor's section of 80 chains on each side; That Section 7 
has such an overage; That this fact often causes uncer-
tainty in actually laying a description out on the ground; 
That he assumed that the overage was not considered in 
the Hummel and Young deeds because when he checked the 
Peterson deed (Tract 3 in Exhibit J) without using the 
overage it coincided with the existing fence lines on the 
Peterson tract; That there is a conflict between the Humtnel 
and Peterson deeds. 
The point to be made by this line of argument is that 
the evidence of the respondents' surveyor fails to satisfac-
torily show that his platting and staking of Hummel and 
Young deeds was correct in that he reasoned that because 
tract 3 was apparently surveyed without considering the 
overage in the section so were tracts 1 and 2. Yet at the 
same time he shows a conflict between the descriptions of 
tracts 1 and 2 with tract 3. Tracts 1 and 2 extend out into 
the street on the east, and tract 1 extends out into the 
street on the north when laid out using the surveyor's as-
sumption. The original Le Vitre deed used the streets on 
two sides to show that the surveyor had used distances with 
a compensation for the overage in the section. 
It is notable that by using the two streets as two sides 
the appellants occupy only the amount of property specified 
in their deed. 
Certainly Mr. Jones said nothing more than that by 
assuming that the Hummel and Young descriptions were 
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made without taking into consideration the overage in Sec-
tion 7 they do not coincide with the existing fences. Cer-
tainly it cannot be said that this is conclusive proof that 
the Young property (tract 1) encroaches on the Hummel 
property when we have such sure facts in the two streets 
which bound the Young property on two sides. These two 
streets appear in the LeVitre·deed received from Hedenberg 
in 1922, which were left out of the deeds of appellants' and 
respondents' predecessors' deeds possibly by inadvertance 
but most certainly not for the purpose of conveying part 
of those streets, by those deeds. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that this is one of those cases which 
helps to high-light the virtue of the principle of repose 
announced by our Court. 
In the face of uncertainty in the Survey (the surveyor 
said he did not know how the original descriptions were 
made but assumed certain unprovable facts) and of long 
years of acquiescence in the existing fences by all parties 
concerned it could hardly be in the interest of justice to 
permit the shifting of these- boundary lines. If the doctrine 
of repose is to have any practical value, then it must be 
applied to such a case as this. The passage of time obliter-
ates the evidence of men's agreements and all we can find 
is the salient facts that in this case a fence was built and 
respected by everyone for some 24 years as the boundary 
between two pieces of property. Even the respondents pur-
chased their property after . visual inspection ( witho?t a 
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survey) and after being satisfied with its size and shape 
and upon the assumption that only that land inside the 
fences was being purchased. So the respondents purchased 
their land and lived there almost six years when by chance 
it was suggested that evidence might be found which would 
show that the existing fences were not in harmony with 
the technical description in their deed. 
It is submitted that respondents are not entitled to 
the judgment given them in the lower Court, and it should 
be reversed with directions that their action be dismissed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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